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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

NIC #03810-85

31 JUL 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Proposed CPPG Meeting on Southern Africa

1. I believe there is a need for the Crisis Pre-Planning Group to examine some of the specific policies and tactics applicable to the southern Africa region. While the 26 July NSC meeting underscored continuing consensus on the broad policy objectives towards South Africa and southern Africa, some of the specific applications of these broad objectives seem to make a questionable contribution to the overall policy objectives. (S)

2. Policies of the past four years have led us to support a Marxist government in Mozambique against a growing insurgency which controls most of the country and to jeopardize the popular leader of an insurgency against a Communist government in Angola in order to accelerate a political process in Namibia which is likely to install a Marxist government there. (S)

3. Specifically, in Angola, the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops would result in the collapse of the MPLA government and a victory for Savimbi. Thus, the MPLA, the Soviet Union, and Cuba will not go for any such deal. The latest version of our proposal--a somewhat exiguous plan for an extended Cuban withdrawal over three years, referred to as "the synthesis"--has been rejected by the MPLA, UNITA, and South Africa (as well as Cuba and the Soviet Union). Incredibly, the blame for the impasse has passed from the Communists to the South Africans, which is against our intention and interest. (S)

4. There is broad agreement in the Intelligence Community that the only pressure capable of moving the MPLA into dealing with Savimbi and dispensing with its Cuban guardians is greatly increased military pressure from UNITA. (S)

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5. The SWAPO movement, the likely beneficiary of a Namibia settlement, appears increasingly weakened by inter- and intra-tribal conflicts and by military defeats, but its ties to the Soviet Bloc appear even stronger. Meanwhile, South African attempts to construct a moderate political grouping in Namibia capable of challenging SWAPO in any election remain unsupported [REDACTED]

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6. In Mozambique, a recent SNIE noted that the insurgent RENAMO movement would continue to drive the Machel regime into smaller and smaller islands of control over the next year. (S)

7. I believe the CPPG should examine new policy options for the southern Africa region. I would suggest the following be among the options examined:

- Shift our diplomatic efforts from Cuban troop withdrawal in Angola to proposals for reconciliation meetings between MPLA and UNITA, as both Savimbi and the South Africans have encouraged us to do. While the MPLA would likely resist this at first, it would again return the world focus on MPLA inflexibility rather than South Africa's, and could provide a framework for actual talks should increased pressure from Savimbi broaden the limited sentiment for talks extant within the MPLA.
- Make an all-out effort to repeal the Clark Amendment. While much has been done on this, repeal is not yet in hand and every effort should be made to avoid slippage. If the Amendment is successfully repealed, our diplomats will have an additional "stick" to pressure MPLA toward reconciliation.

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- Give Savimbi the legitimacy he deserves and desires, by agreeing (as we did in December 1981) to a new visit by Savimbi to the United States where he would be received at senior levels.

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- Rather than sending new missions to Luanda with new formulations on Cuban withdrawal--moves which discomfort and weaken Savimbi and produce no results--should we not wait for battlefield pressures to move the MPLA to come to us? We should not categorically exclude ourselves from contacts with the MPLA, however.
- Reopen our mission in Windhoek, Namibia [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] in order to give some recognition to non-Communist, moderate political forces inside Namibia. We might consider looking at ways and means of encouraging support to such forces. [REDACTED]

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/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey

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